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I
INTRODUCTION
After nearly fifteen years of significant international attention to official
commissions investigating past rights atrocities—and four years since such
bodies have been known generically as “truth commissions” and have been
studied comparatively—it is appropriate to take stock and consider general
recommendations for the future.1  All truth commissions are created on an ad
hoc basis, usually set up in the midst of a political transition as a means to re-
spond to the legacy of a horrific past.  These commissions are intentionally
short-lived, and neither mirror the courts nor a human rights ombudsman in
their function and aims.  By their very nature, truth commissions are quite pli-
able, and can be created in almost any shape or size, and to fit any number of
agendas, depending on the circumstances and who holds the most influence
over their design and operation.  While there are good reasons for each to be
shaped and empowered differently, there must be minimal standards for such a
body to be considered a serious, good faith effort and respectful of those who
will be affected by its work.
International guidelines, or minimal standards, could well be helpful to
those crafting a truth commission.  The crafters virtually always begin with no
experience in ad hoc, official truth-seeking on great numbers of rights abuses,
and may be genuinely unaware of the pitfalls that lie ahead.  Guidelines could
also, of course, facilitate appropriate international and national oversight by
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1. The first truth commission to gain significant international attention was the National Com-
mission on the Disappeared in Argentina, which was in operation from 1983 to 1984, see NUNCA MS:
THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DISAPPEARED (1st Am. ed. 1986),
but the term “truth commission” was not used generically to describe these investigatory bodies until
after the U.N. Commission on the Truth released its report in early 1993.  See From Madness to Hope:
The 12-Year War in El Salvador, Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, Annex at
189-90, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993) [hereinafter El Salvador Peace Accord].
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those who take an interest in the government’s rights policies.
The first detailed proposal for such guidelines was published in 1996 by the
U.N. Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities, in the form of a draft “Set of Principles for the Protection and Promo-
tion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity.”2  This set of prin-
ciples outlines a right to the truth, recommends a universal standard for the
protection and accessibility of documentary evidence, and calls for extrajudicial
commissions of inquiry to be set up to establish the facts.  It is not clear what
states would be subject to these recommendations, although the recommenda-
tions appear to be very far-reaching.
This set of principles is both broad and fairly detailed, and is an important
contribution to an otherwise still-fuzzy field.  For example, the principles rec-
ommend the following:  that members of a commission of inquiry be irremov-
able; that evidence resulting from commission investigations be safeguarded for
later use by the courts; that naming perpetrators may be appropriate if certain
guarantees are respected; that a commission’s final report should always be
public and widely disseminated; and that legislation or other measures should
be enacted to oversee the storage and preservation of pertinent archives, to
which the commission and courts should be given free access.3
I would second many of the principles spelled out in this U.N. document,
but I am troubled by others, particularly those arising out of one of the core
presumptions that pervade the document.  Specifically, I would question the
stated assumption that establishing and publicizing details about past abuses
will always reduce the likelihood of future abuses or conflict, and the resulting
recommendation that there is a “duty to remember” that cannot be ques-
tioned.4
The question of whether intensive truth-seeking should be a universal norm
is still open for debate (which I will return to below).  But I would submit that
there is agreement on a more important point:  that if official truth-seeking is
undertaken, it must be undertaken in good faith and satisfy certain minimal re-
quirements.  It is here that guidelines could be very helpful.
                                                          
2. U.N. Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Annex II
at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Principles].  This set of principles is
not final; it will be further revised by the U.N. Subcommission meeting in August 1997.  As of publica-
tion, the final set of principles has not been officially released, although a draft of the final document is
included as an appendix to this Symposium.
3. Id. at 11, 13-14,  principles 6(b), 12-18.
4. Under the heading “The Duty to Remember,” the Draft Principles state the following:
A People’s knowledge of the history of their oppression is part of their heritage and, as such,
shall be preserved by appropriate measures in fulfillment of the State’s duty to remember.
Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in
particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.
Id. at 10, principle 2.
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II
TRUTH COMMISSIONS GROWING IN NUMBER
Truth commissions have been multiplying rapidly around the world in re-
cent years.  Although each new commission is different from the others, all
grow out of similar transitional dynamics and with the same general ends in
mind:  to confront, record, and acknowledge the truth about a past period of
widespread rights abuses, with the hope of contributing to reconciliation, heal-
ing, and reform.  A truth commission should be distinguished from a govern-
ment human rights office set up to watch over current human rights abuses, and
also from non-governmental projects documenting past abuses.  A commission,
officially sanctioned by the government (and the armed opposition, where rele-
vant), focuses on documenting and investigating a pattern of abuses in the past,
and sets down recommendations of how to prevent the recurrence of such prac-
tices in the future.
A truth commission can play an important role in a country’s transition out
of a horrible past precisely because such a commission is an official, govern-
ment-sanctioned process of acknowledging the extent of past events.  If prop-
erly established and effectively run, such a commission can be used to begin
processes of serious reform, reparation to victims, and other forms of account-
ability.  Its official status may result in greater access to government informa-
tion and documentation, greater security or protection in its investigations,
more attention from the press and the international community, and wider dis-
tribution of its report.
Of course, there should always be concern that a truth-seeking body might
be created with no coinciding commitment to institute real reform.  While it
may contribute to healing and help establish a historical record, a commission
itself does not have the power to institute reforms or make policy changes.  It
must depend on the political will and interest of the government for its recom-
mendations to be given force.
We should expect differences between commissions, as each country must
shape a process out of its own historical, political, and cultural context.  Unlike
courts, which generally stand as permanent bodies, and about which there are
many international norms regarding their appropriate structure, components,
powers, and the minimal standards under which their proceedings should be
undertaken, there are many aspects of truth commissions that will change from
country to country.  There is an accepted range of powers and mandates within
which different commissions will fall.  Some commissions are given subpoena
powers, or even strong search and seizure powers, and hold public hearings in
front of television cameras.  Others hold all investigations and interviews of
victims and witnesses behind closed doors, may not have the power to compel
witnesses to testify, and release information to the public only through a final
report.  As well, commissions’ mandates will differ in relation to the types of
abuses to be investigated, perhaps including acts by the armed opposition as
well as government forces, for example, or perhaps limited to certain specific
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practices such as disappearances.  Such variations are a natural reflection of the
differences in countries’ politics, political culture, history, and needs.
III
THE CAVEAT:  RELIVING HORRORS IS NOT FOR EVERYONE
Must an obligation to investigate the truth be imposed at all costs?  Are
there conditions in which a truth commission might not be such a good idea?
There are some countries, although few, which emerge from a horrid civil war
or other period of intense violence with no interest in investigating the details
of recent events.  Where this reflects a broad consensus, a policy of reconcilia-
tion through silence, through trying to forget the past, should be acceptable and
accepted by the international community.  Some observers may question a
policy of reconciliation based on forgetting, but it would be short-sighted to
overrule such a consensus without a close look at the factors behind it.  My re-
search in Mozambique, for example, reveals a broad agreement that digging up
the horrors of that war might only tear apart the measure of peace and recon-
ciliation that has been achieved.5
But the position taken by many international rights advocates seems to pre-
scribe truth-seeking unconditionally.  As their starting point, scholars cite an
emerging right to truth that is outlined in international conventions and rein-
forced by recent decisions in international fora.6  The draft U.N. principles de-
scribed above reflect a common position taken on this issue:
Every society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events and about
the circumstances and reasons which led, through the consistent pattern of gross vio-
lations of human rights, to the perpetration of aberrant crimes.  Full and effective ex-
ercise of the right to the truth is essential to avoid any recurrence of such acts in the
future.7
I agree that there is a right to the truth.  But should a society’s right to know
the truth be turned into an unbending obligation?  That is, if those persons
most directly affected by the knowledge, the victims themselves, are not inter-
ested or not yet prepared to re-enter into these horrors, should they be obliged
to do so?  For a number of reasons—perhaps because support systems have not
been set up, such as mechanisms to deal with re-awakened trauma, or because
they have other urgent and pressing priorities, or because they fear that talking
about the past will spark conflict anew—victims sometimes show no interest in
focusing on their past suffering.  Some communities have found other routes to
reconciliation.  The desire for an official truth-seeking process could also some-
                                                          
5. My forthcoming book will explain the case of Mozambique in detail.  Publication is expected
in 1998.
6. For example, some point to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ guarantee of
a “right to receive information,” and to the right to “seek, receive and impart information” guaranteed
in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  G.A. Res. 217 (Dec. 10, 1948).  As well,
in the Velsquez Rodrquez case of July 29, 1988, the Inter-American Court concluded that the state
has a duty to investigate the fate of the disappeared and disclose the information to relatives.  Case 4,
Inter-Am. L.H.R. 35, OEH/ser LIV/111.19, doc. 13 (1988).
7. Draft Principles, supra note 2, at 10, principle 1 (“The Inalienable Right to the Truth”).
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times be a function of time, as institutions are strengthened and as the tensions
that might spark conflict die down; countries might wait years or even decades
before they are able to confront and honestly record some events.8  The as-
sumption behind the argument that the future is always better if the past is ex-
humed—and done so immediately at the point of transition—is troublesome,
and may lead to inappropriate recommendations.
In the great majority of cases, however, there are some groups or sectors of
society that do very much want the full truth revealed, and others whose inter-
ests are better served either by silence or by allowing only a narrow portion of
the truth to be revealed.  It is in these circumstances where continued denial is
likely to result in a simmering conflict and hinder attempts to promote societal
healing.
For those in the international community watching these transitions from
afar with an interest in combating impunity and solidifying peace, this presents
a bit of a dilemma.  It is not obvious, nor is there a simple test, to determine
where a truth commission should be prescribed, and where a government
should be encouraged, or even pushed, to confront the pains of the victims in
its society.9  There is a need for further thought on how these dynamics might
be measured or gauged.  For now, we can only cite examples such as Mozam-
bique and, perhaps, Cambodia where, despite some nudging from the outside,
there appears to be little interest in delving into the details of the past.  Both
cases are complex; I leave the details to be explored elsewhere.
There is another difficulty around the right to the truth:  Where there have
been massive numbers of atrocities, obtaining the full truth on an individual
level may simply be impossible.  Regardless of international norms, states
rarely have the resources and ability to investigate all individual cases, even
where clear evidence and witnesses exist, which is often the case.  Thus, while a
case-by-case individual truth is usually demanded by victims (and expected by
most of those who give testimony), and individualized truth is called for by
those suggesting international norms,10 usually only a global truth, a description
                                                          
8. This is not to dispute the benefits of undertaking investigations at the point of transition, as is
done in so many countries.  But in some circumstances, this may not be possible or may not best suit
the interests of a country.
9. The case of Cambodia presents an interesting example of how non-national players sometimes
push a country to confront its past.  The main project in Cambodia to document the Khmer Rouge
crimes of the 1970s is through a U.S.-funded organization, growing out of an initiative of the U.S. gov-
ernment (originally funded through the Cambodia Genocide Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat.
486 (1994), to fund the investigation of Khmer Rouge atrocities).  But, for a host of reasons, it is still
not clear how much interest there is from Cambodians in this work.  On the other side, there are cases
where a government has had trouble obtaining international financial support for truth-seeking initia-
tives, because the international community providing it with aid believes that other development pri-
orities are more important.  Malawi may be such a case.
10. The Draft Principles state, “Irrespective of any legal proceedings, the families of victims shall
have the right to know the truth about the fate of their relatives.  In cases of enforced disappearance
or of abduction of children, this right shall be imprescriptible.”  Draft Principles, supra note 2, at 10,
principle 3.  Elsewhere, José Zalaquett argues that “[t]he truth must be complete … [including] what is
the fate of the victims, individually, who gave the orders and who carried them out.”  See José
Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Ap-
plicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 30 (Aspen Institute,
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of patterns, is possible.  This fact is always a disappointment to the victims, who
may have provided testimony with the hope that their own case would be
solved.
IV
INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES: A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL
What might be considered minimal guidelines for the creation and opera-
tion of a truth commission?  What minimal requirements should we expect a
sponsoring government to satisfy?  In addition to many of the specific princi-
ples outlined in the U.N. document, I would propose the following.
A. Public Participation in Crafting the Commission
Truth commissions are usually created through presidential decree or leg-
islation, or agreed to in a negotiated peace settlement.  There has typically
been little direct public participation in the crafting of their terms of reference,
due to the nature of a fast-paced transition, the limited communication or pub-
lic participation in initial transitional policies, and the sense of urgency in es-
tablishing such a commission quickly.11  Despite these constraints, those consid-
ering such a commission should give much more attention to how the public,
victim communities, and non-governmental organizations can voice their
opinions and concerns as the terms of such a commission are shaped.  Commu-
nication with these groups should be maintained during the work of the com-
mission to allow public feedback on the methodology and impact of the com-
mission’s work.
B. Time and Resources for Preparation and Set-Up
Many past truth commissions have suffered from the same problem:  They
have lost much time in administrative and logistical preparations, which have
cut significantly into the limited period of time that each commission is given to
undertake and complete all of its work.  Essential organizational details such as
renting an office, hiring staff, buying desks and computers, and adapting or cre-
ating a database program, as well as larger tasks such as raising funds and de-
signing a public outreach program, can easily consume months of a commis-
sion’s time before it can even begin investigations.  Out of an operational
mandate of perhaps six months to two years, such delays can be disastrous and
cause much consternation on the part of observers, especially victims and rights
advocates, who may be frustrated at the commission’s slow start.  Those estab-
lishing future commissions should avoid this major pitfall by mandating explicit
                                                          
1989).
11. In contrast to other commissions to date, South Africa offers an example of extensive public
participation in the creation of its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, including extensive parlia-
mentary hearings on draft legislation and submissions of comment from many organizations and other
interested parties.
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set-up time, written into the terms of reference (which outlines a commission’s
powers and structure), before the commission’s operational clock begins.
During this time, resources, support, and international consultation should be
provided, as needed, to assist in the commission’s preparations.
C. Flexible but Strong Mandate for Investigation
Each commission’s mandate should be appropriate to the situation or con-
flict at hand, and flexible enough to allow interpretation by the members of the
commission.  It is far preferred that a commission’s mandate does not list spe-
cific events to be investigated, instead using more general language to allow the
commission to shape its investigations and report around the facts and patterns
revealed.  Language calling for investigation into “serious acts of violence
which have impacted on society” or “gross violations of human rights, including
violations which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse,”12 have given past
commissions the leeway to judge which crimes, or which patterns of abuse, de-
mand investigation and public explanation.
D. Political Backing and Operational Independence
Clear backing from the government is essential for such a commission to
work with full authority.  Explicit official support for its work can provide in-
creased security, a higher public profile, and facilitate access to restricted or
classified government documents.  The government, and armed opposition,
where relevant, should be expected to provide records to the commission perti-
nent to its investigations, including restricted documents.  Officials or former
officials with knowledge of the acts and events under investigation should be
expected to provide information to the commission, either in public hearings or
in private meetings.
Such support for a commission’s work should coincide with clear opera-
tional independence, necessary for the commission to undertake investigation
into often politically sensitive topics.  Once established, the commission should
operate free of direct influence or control by the government, including in the
interpreting of its written mandate (within any constraints that are indicated),
in developing its operating methodology for research and public outreach, and
in shaping its report and recommendations.
E. Appropriate Funding and Staffing
To the extent possible, full funding for the commission should be commit-
ted and available at the start of the commission’s work.  This is particularly im-
portant if the commission is fully or largely funded by the government that is
under investigation, so that the question of continued funding cannot be used,
or be perceived to be used, as a point of leverage to influence the commission’s
                                                          
12. This approximates the language in the mandates of the El Salvador and South African truth
commissions, respectively.   See El Salvador Peace Accord, supra note 1, at 190;  4(a)(i) of Promotion
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 (S. Afr.).
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work.  While circumstances and needs differ between countries, staff might in-
clude lawyers, human rights experts, computer specialists, criminal investiga-
tors, researchers, therapists or social workers, forensic specialists, historians,
data entry staff, and security personnel.
F. Implementation of Recommendations
While there might be no prior commitment to implement the recommenda-
tion of a commission, there should be good faith that the government, and the
opposition, where relevant, will give serious consideration to its recommenda-
tions and give credence to its findings.
G. The Role of the International Community
Responsibility for a successful commission does not lie solely in the hands
of the sponsoring government.  There are a number of important roles for the
international community, including not only in oversight and funding, where
needed, but also in providing information.  Foreign governments often have ex-
tensive information in their files pertaining to specific cases or ongoing prac-
tices in the country under study, especially when these foreign governments ac-
tively supported either the government or the opposition during the years when
abuses were common.  The U.S. government is of course well known for its ex-
tensive documentation, spread throughout many of its agencies, which tracks
events, persons, and patterns of human rights violations.  The United States
and other governments should be expected to cooperate fully with the efforts
of a truth commission, particularly when a commission has submitted a direct
request for information and documentation from their files.  The record in this
area, particularly by the U.S. government, has not been strong.
V
CONCLUSION
Past truth commissions have varied widely in structure, mandate, operating
methodology, and end product.  Such differences are an appropriate reflection
of the needs, constraints, and political culture of each country, and similar dif-
ferences are to be expected in future commissions, yet to be created.  But al-
lowing for variation does not diminish the importance of minimal standards,
such that any official truth-seeking process is done in good faith, and results in
an honest and unrestricted investigation.
The guidelines suggested here, taken in conjunction with many of the prin-
ciples outlined in the U.N. proposal, could begin to give us leverage points with
which to press for serious efforts in investigating the past.
